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BOOK REVIEW

Trading in Controversy
NEIL DUxBuRYI
INTRODUCTION

The question of what might constitute the appropriate limits of the market domain has, of late, inspired a significant
amount of legal scholarship.' This development is hardly surprising. For all the advantages that they may bring, markets,
we know, create myriad difficulties. People may find themselves
exploited, coerced, excluded, discriminated against, degraded or
otherwise disadvantaged owing to market arrangements. Some
of the costs or disadvantages that come with the operation of
markets will be bearable.2 Where this is not the case, however,
academic lawyers (among others) must try to determine, first of
all, why particular market-created costs are unacceptable and,
secondly, what will be an appropriate legal response to the
problem.
One American law professor who has been addressing these
issues for well over a decade now is Margaret Jane Radin. In
her earlier writings, Radin was concerned primarily with the
distinction between what she terms fungible and personal propt Reader in Law, University of Manchester, United Kingdom. I am grateful to Martin Loughlin, William Lucy and Mike Redmayne for comments on an earlier version of
this review.
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LnsTrs OF FREEDOM OF CONMACT (1993);
CASS R. SUNSTEN, FREE MARKnS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (forthcoming).
2. I have tried elsewhere to argue as much with regard to the degrading effects of
markets. See Neil Duxhury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61 BROoK. L. REV. 657 (1995)
[hereinafter Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation]; Neil Duxbury, Do Markets Degrade?, 59 MOD. L. REv. 331 (1996) [hereinafter Duxhury, Do Markets Degrade?].
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erty.3 Whereas fungible property has a purely economic or instrumental value, personal property is property that the owner
is bound up with to such a degree that its loss would cause him
or her pain that could not be relieved simply by replacing the
object with other goods of equal market value. Thus, a credit
card is likely to be fungible, whereas many items of jewellery
will (for their owners) have more personal significance. It is important to keep in mind that not all property can be straightforwardly classified as personal or fingible. One's word-processor,
for instance, might fall into either category, depending upon
what is stored on the hard disk. Radin's point, however, is that
all private property will lie somewhere on the continuum between personal and fungible. 4 All such property, that is, will be

more fungible than personal or vice versa.
According to Radin, this broad distinction between personal
and fungible should be reflected generally in the manner in
which rights to private property are regulated. She claims that
there should be a presumption that rights to personal property
deserve stronger legal protection than rights to fungible property.5 This claim, as developed in her earlier writings, attracted
a good deal of criticism. Since different people will hold different
views as to where particular property rights lie on the personalfungible continuum, arguments for according special protections
to some property rights because of their peculiarly personal status must be deemed too idiosyncratic to form the basis for regulatory strategies.6 There neither exists nor can exist social consensus concerning the appropriate categorization
of property
7
rights along the personal-fungible continuum.
Many critics of Radin's early writings also felt that she was
making a mistake in using rent control to try to illustrate why
personal property is, as compared with fungible property, generally more deserving of special legal protection.8 To argue that
the peculiarly personal nature of residential leases justifies
maintaining rents at levels which landlords find unprofitable is
3. The principals of these early writings are to be found in

MARGAR

JANE RADIN,

REnTRPRETNG PROPERTY (1993).

4. Id. at 53-4.
5. See RADIN, supra note 3, at 48.

6. See Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BRooK I. Rv. 741, 770-72 (1988).
7. See Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Prtzgmatism A Critique of Radin's Theory
of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. RV. 347, 362-79 (1993).
8. See, ag., Dan Greenberg, Radin on Personhoodand Rent Control, 73 THE MoNIST
642 (1990); Timothy J. Brennan, Rights, Market Failure,and Rent Control: A Comment
on Radin, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1988).
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to ignore the fact that, if rent levels are controlled in this manner, few people will wish to be landlords. 9 Such a consequence
hardly could be said to favor the interests of prospective residential tenants. 10 Furthermore, using residential leases to illustrate how the value of personal property extends beyond the
reach of the market seems a rather odd strategy, given that
leases are an obvious example of the personal property right as
commodity." In order to draw attention to what Radin terms the
"nonmarket personal significance"2 of certain property rights, it
would make better sense to focus not on something which is
traded, but on those things which-although, in principle, they
could be traded-have traditionally been considered inappropriate for commodification.
Such a change of emphasis occurs in Radin's latest book,
Contested Commodities. Rather than highlight the non-market
character of things which are traded, Radin examines certain
goods and activities the commodification of which is generally
contested. Although she takes issue with proponents of "universal commodification"-theorists who would try to explain all
human behavior in market terms'--she does not believe that
expansion of the market domain is always unwelcome. She contends, for example, that, subject to certain regulatory safeguards, "we should now decriminalize the sale of sexual services." Furthermore, she claims to be wary of "slippery slope"
or "domino effect" arguments about market domination which
proceed on the assumption that commercial and non-commercial
valuations of the same goods and activities cannot exist side by
side.' 6 What Radin is seeking is some sort of "middle way" between traditional arguments for and against the extension of
market activity.17 Developing this middle way demands an appreciation of "incomplete commodification" as a market phenom9. See Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, supra note 2, at 673.
10. See RIcHARD A. Posm, OVERCOMING LAw 303 (1995).
11. See Duxbury, Do Markets Degrade?, supra note 2, at 334.
12. RADIN, supra note 3, at 140.
13. MARGARmt JANE RADiN,. CONTESTED COMMODrrms (1996).

14. Radin states at the outset of the book that, "[a]s an archetype, universal commodification is oversimplified, a caricature.' Id. at 2. Chicago neo-classical economics,
particularly as developed by Gary Becker and Richard Posner, "call[s] readily to mind
th[is] archetype . Id. at 3. Later on in the book, her position seems to change in that she
writes about the possibility of a person being "fully committed to the archetype of universal commodification7-adding that Becker is 'prhaps" one such person. Id. at 103.
15. Id. at 135.
16. Id. at 96-101.
17. Id. at xiL
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enon, a recognition that "many things can be usefully understood as ... 8 neither fully commodified nor fully removed from
the market."1

Cass Sunstein has recently argued that, when people need
to make collective decisions but find themselves in conflict on
basic issues of principle, they will often seek to achieve incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes. 19 Rather
than try to agree on high-level principles, judges in particular
do better to develop the law in a cautious, ad hoc fashion,
searching out principles which, while not especially ambitious,
20
at least facilitate the emergence of some degree of consensus.
The notion of incompleteness operates as a compromise measure
in Radin's work also. "[A]n incomplete commodification," she observes, "can sometimes substitute for a complete noncommodification that might accord with our ideals but cause too much
harm in our nonideal world."2 l When the trade of something
seems contentious but unavoidable, in other words, incomplete
22
commodification may be the best, if not the ideal, response.
In presenting the case for incomplete commodification in
this way, Radin argues as a self-styled pragmatist. 23 Pragmatism, she insists, requires sensitivity to context. 24 "[Flor each
case of contested commodification," she claims, "I believe we
should look and see how powerful the market conceptualization
is in context. We should consider whether under some circumstances market understandings and nonmarket understandings
can stably coexist."25 Sometimes, the issue of commodification

will create a "double bind." 26 That is, both the commodification
of, and the failure to commodify, particular goods and activities
may prove harmful. While there can exist "no handy algorithm"27 for deciding what should be done in such circumstances, "the answer must be pragmatic. We must look carefully
18. Id. at 20.
19. See CASs R SuNSTEN. LEGAL REASONING AND PoLrnIcAL CoNucT 35-61 (1996).
20. Judges, of course, are not alone in proceeding in this fashion. For another example of decision-making by resort to incompletely theorized agreement, see Stephen E.
Toulmin, The National Commission on Human Experimentation: Proceduresand Outcomes, in SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES: CASE STUDIES IN THE RESOLUTION AND CLOSURE OF

DISPUTEs IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 599-613, 611 (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Arthur L. Caplan eds., 1987).
21. RADIN, supra note 13, at 104.
22. Id. at 110.
23. Radin, supra note 13, at xi.
24. Id. at 76-8, 131-32.
25. Id. at 104.
26. Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 126.
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at the nonideal circumstances in each case and decide which
horn of the dilemma is better (or less bad)."2
In this review, I shall offer two general criticisms of Radin's
perspective as presented in her latest book. First, I shall suggest
that, despite her claims concerning the importance of contextsensitivity, Radin herself sometimes uses not real social contexts
but extreme hypotheticals and caricatures in order to illustrate
and support her line of argument. This inclination to rely on exaggerations and stereotypes fits in with one specific claim which
emerges frequently throughout the book: that thinking makes it
so-that is, that the more we use market theory to explain
human activity, the more human activity will actually become
commodified. Secondly, I shall argue that the notion of contested
commodification turns out itself to be unavoidably contestable
owing to the fact that Radin is able only to assert, but cannot
demonstrate, the existence of some fundamental shared consensus concerning the proper scope of markets.
I. WORST NIGHTMAREs

"Like other pragmatists," Radin asserts, "I do not find it
very useful to go too far into hypothetical realms unconnected
with our own circumstances." 29 This assertion comes as rather a
surprise, given some of the other statements to be found in the
book. In developing an argument to the effect that "babyselling"30 ought never to be permitted, for example, she invites
us to contemplate thus:
If a free-market baby industry were to come into being, with all of its accompanying paraphernalia, how could any of us, even those who did not
produce infants for sale, avoid measuring the dollar value of our chil-

dren? How could our children avoid being preoccupied with measuring
their own dollar value? This measurement makes our discourse about
ourselves (when we are children) and about our children (when we are
parents) like our discourse about cars .... [If wealth determined who
gets a child, we would know that the adoptive parents valued the child
31
as much as a Volvo but not as much as a Mercedes.

28. Id at 127.
29. Id. at 161-62.
30. Id. at 136. A term which, in itself, might be considered emotive and misleading.
what is for sale is not the baby, but parental rights. Those who advocate markets in
adoptions and commercial surrogacy are not, as I understand it, arguing that such markets should facilitate the deprivation of individual autonomy. See, eg., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 410

(1992).

31. Radin, supra note 13, at 138-39.

620

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

The fundamental problem is that:
[o]nce something has a price, money must be a part of the interaction
....
If our children know that the going rate of babies is $10,000, they
will know that they are worth $10,000 .... Worse, if they know that the
market price of 'good' babies is $10,000,. whereas the price of 'mediumgrade' babies is only $8,000, they will be anxiously comparing themselves
32
with the 'good' grade of child in hopes that they measure up.

Furthermore, she states, "if children have a market value,
then even parents who do not put their children up for adoption
will know what their children are worth, and how much money
they are losing by not doing so .... We will all know how much
we cost our parents."33
Any proposal for trade in parental rights ought to be
treated with extreme reservation. Not the least problem is that,
where such trade is permitted, both those who sell and those
who are sold may find themselves exploited.3 4 But the objection
which Radin is mounting in the above quotations seems, for at
least two reasons, to be far from compelling.
First, her reasoning is not especially clear. Assuming trade
in parental rights were permitted, it would be highly unlikely
that children would have a market value. Children-even grades
of children, to use Radin's imagery-would not all be accorded
the same value, just as, for example, all two-bedroom houses are
not accorded the same value. Although markets generate monetary valuations, they do not preclude the possibility of the same
objects (notionally speaking) attracting different valuations. The
creation of a so-called market for babies would not mean that
they could be rigidly priced according to standard.
Secondly, Radin's reasoning is rooted in the sort of hypothetical realm, and relies on the style of slippery-slope alarmism, that she purports to eschew. The fact that something is accorded market value does not necessarily mean that we will
each value that thing in commercial terms. My wedding ring
has a monetary value; yet, while I know this, that is not how I
value it. Similarly with children: if it were the case that specific
children were being sold at a specific price, it would not follow
that everybody would then value their children according to that
price. If, as individuals, we lament some particular change in
our world-a decline in good manners, charity, craftsmanship,
32. Id. at 101.
33. 1d&at 98.
34. For an examination of this problem along with others, see J. Robert S. Prichard,
A Market for Babies?, 34 U. ToRoNTo LJ. 341 (1984).

1997]

621

TRADING IN CONTROVERSY

or whatever-our inclination will often be to resist rather than
to accept that change. Likewise with markets. That something
has market value does not mean that it becomes, for everybody,
commercialized. Some people will still retain their capacity to
resist. Yet this is precisely what Radin does not acknowledge.
She portrays human beings as inevitably defined by market
rhetoric; and it is from this portrait that she is able to concoct a
nightmare image of children as fungible items which could have
been borrowed from science fiction.3 5
The manner in which Radin condemns baby-selling is but
an instance of a more general tendency on her part to argue by
attacking caricatures. This tendency is epitomized when she
turns her attention to public choice theory. "The basic methodological premise of public choice theory," Radin asserts, "is a rigorous atomistic individualism. The basic moral stance .

.

. is

that the theory doesn't need one. This is 'positive' theory, unconcerned with the goodness or badness of political actors and institutions, seeking only to observe how incentives and institutional
structures interact to produce empirical consequences." 36 The
fundamental impoverishment of the public choice perspective is
attributable to the fact that its proponents "assume a static
model of human behavior. On the whole, they don't think we can
change the sorry state of democracy-as-we-know-it 37 As a characterization of public choice theory, this seems misleading. For
the fact of the matter is that public choice is more than just a
positive theory. Certainly the positive dimension of public choice
theory-explaining how "trade" among self-interested politicians,
public officials and private interest groups can produce laws
which are adverse to the public interest-often generates rather
pessimistic, some might say cynical, conclusions. 38 But there is
also a normative dimension to the theory: viz, prescribing
changes in constitutional and general institutional arrangements in order to control and improve the functioning of the political process. As two of the principal representatives of public
choice theory claim:
35. See Philip K. Dick, The Pre-Persons,in 5 WE

CAN REMEMBER ITFOR YOU

WHOLE-

SALE: THE COLLECTED STORIES OF PHIIP K DICK 355-77 (1994).

36. Radin, supra note 13, at 207.
37. Id. at 215.
38. See, eg., Steven Kelman, 'Public Choice' and Public Spirit, 87 THE PUB. INTEREr
80, 93-4 (1987) (arguing, apropos of public choice, that "[cynical descriptive conclusions
about behavior in government threaten to undermine the norm prescribing public
spirit").
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Public choice... can be properly defended on moral grounds if we adopt
a 'constitutional perspective'-that is, if the purpose of the exercise is
conceived to be institutional reform, improvements in the rules under
which political processes operate. This perspective requires that we shift
attention away from the analysis of policy choice by existing agents
within existing rules, and towards the examination of alternative sets of
rules. Improvement, or hope for improvement, emerges not from any expectation that observed agents will behave differently from the way the
existing set of incentives leads them to behave, but from a shift in the
rules that define these incentives .... His [i.e., the public choice theorist's] task is not the Machiavellian one of advising governors, directly or
indirectly, on how they ought to behave. His task is that of advising all
citizens on the working of alternative constitutional rules.39

By neglecting to take account of the normative aspect of
public choice theory, Radin is able to characterize it as amoral.
Yet anyone familiar with public choice literature will recognize
the inadequacy of this characterization.

Radin's somewhat alarmist style of argumentation is attributable to more, I think, than merely a predisposition to caricature. Accounting for this style requires also an appreciation of
the manner in which she connects thoughts and deeds. In essence, her position is that "[o]ur conceptualizations of what is
matter for what is" ...

that the way we conceive of things mat-

ters to who we are."41 She believes "that most of the time Chicago-style market rhetoric does not of itself operate to bring on
literal markets"42 and "that even if it is wrong to sell babies, it
is not wrong for Richard Posner or Gary Becker to conceive of
children as commodities and speak of them in market rhetoric."43 Such pronouncements of belief, however, do not go unqualified. "[M]etaphorical markets cannot be placed beyond the scope
of concern by defining them as 'mere' discourse as opposed to action,"44 for "something important to humanity is lost if market
rhetoric becomes (or is considered to be) the sole rhetoric of
39. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case
for the Wobel' Lie, 74 VA. L REv. 179, 187 (1988).
40. Radin, supra note 13, at 88. I have no quarrel with the essence of Radin's position here. No doubt people sometimes can and indeed do think themselves into certain
states. My problem rests with Radin's effort to turn this point into a critique of market
rhetoric. For a graphic illustration of how people can sometimes think themselves into
particular states, see JUNE CHANG, WIL SWANS: THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA (1991).

41. Radin, supra note 13, at 93.
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id. at 164.
44. Id. at 14.
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human affairs."4 For example, "[t]hinking of rape in market
rhetoric implicitly conceives of as fungible something that we
know to be personal"4 and is thus "threatening to personhood." 7
"he more we conceive of all things that people value as mere
preferences that can be expressed in dollars and traded off
against other dollar values, the more it is so"48-indeed, "[t]he
reason people are troubled by 'mere' market rhetoric, when applied in ways they think inappropriate, is that they think it will
be contagious and will lead to literal commodification." 49 Hence,
thinking would appear to make it so; and therefore, to return to
baby-selling, "Posner and Becker's conceptual scheme, if it becomes widespread, must structure, or help to structure, our relationships with our children."50 Market rhetoric, when introduced
into areas of human life where we do not normally expect to
51
find it, alters "the texture of the human world."
The import of these quotations seems unclear. Market rhetoric does not "bring on" literal markets; yet it is "contagious'the more we think in market terms, "the more it is so." Thoseas if such people existed-who wish to adopt market rhetoric as
"the sole rhetoric of human affairs" should be permitted to do
so; yet allowing them to do so is to risk altering the texture of
the human world. What does emerge very clearly, yet again,
from the above quotations is Radin's fatalistic view of human
behavior. Absent from her observations is an acknowledgement
of the human capacity for abstinence. Nobody, she appears to be
claiming, can be unaffected by the introduction of markets or
market rhetoric. No doubt, sometimes, general human behavior
will be altered when markets are introduced into particular domains. Most people who would otherwise give blood, for example, might not wish to do so if it can be bought and sold.52 As an
assessment of the power of markets and market rhetoric in general, however, Radin's claim, or apparent claim, seems overreliant on exaggeration.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 122.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 165.
To use a phrase which Radin borrows from Putnam, see RADiN, supra note 13,
at 88 and 122 and HLARY PUTNAM REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 141 (1981).
52. For the classic study of this particular issue, see RicHARD M Trrmuss, THE GIFT
RELATIONSHIP FROM HUmN BLOOD TO SociAL PoucY (1970).
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THE PRESUMPTION OF SHARED UNDERSTANDING

In the past, Radin has been taken to task for founding her
critique of market reasoning on an unelaborated, indeed unstated, theory of human flourishing.53 Drawing upon and developing Nussbaum's Aristotelian theory of human essentialism,54
she endeavors in Contested Commodities to remedy this shortcoming.55 In doing so, however, she in effect draws attention to a
difficulty which rests at the heart of her critique.
According to Radin, "[t]he human capacity for selfmutability, for context-transcendence, is much more mysterious
than the reductionism of commodification would portray it."56
"[M]any kinds of solidarity and interrelations between people
are central to our conception of human flourishing," and one of
the advantages of "[i]ncomplete commodification as an expression of a nonmarket order coexistent with a market order" is
that it can accommodate our "ideals of personhood and community."

Note that Radin is assuming the existence of a shared

conception of human flourishing. The idea of shared understanding in fact runs throughout the book. That there is a difficulty
in making such an assumption is something which Radin recognizes. "W]ho," she asks, "is 'we' here?"58 "We," she acknowledges,
"may be identified in various very vague or very specific waysas 'our' dominant culture,"59 as "the mainstream group of 'us,' 6 0
as "philosophizers about social justice,"61 or whatever. While recognizing this difficulty, however, Radin frequently appeals to
what she believes we instinctively know, to our shared understandings about the appropriate reach of markets. When faced
with difficulties and double binds created by markets, she
claims, "we try to make incremental changes for the better, as
we see the better."6 2 The real problem here, of course, concerns
53. See Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, supra note 2, at 666.
54. For the details of which, see, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning
and Social Justice: In Defense of AristotelianEssentialism, 20 PoL. THEoRY 202 (1992);
Non-Relative Virtues: An AristotelianApproach, in THE QUATY OF LxFE 242-69 (Martha
C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); Martha Nussbaum, Human Capabilities,Female Human Beings, in WoMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOpMENT: A STUDY OF HumAN CAPA.
BILITIE 61-104 (Martha Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
55. Radin, supra note 13, at 63-78.
56. Id. at 78.
57. Id. at 113.
58. Id. at 58.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 95.
61. Id. at 65.

62. Id. at 131.
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what it means to say that "we" see the better. Statements such
as that "we should recognize a continuum reflecting degrees of
commodification that will be appropriate in a given context," 63 or
that, when confronted with double binds, "[w]e must.., decide
which horn of the dilemma is ... less bad"64 simply highlight
the problem. Appropriate, or less bad, according to whom? According to what criteria? Having conceded that appealing to
"our" shared understandings about commodification is a dubious
and contestable strategy, Radin adopts just that strategy.
When Radin makes claims purportedly founded on shared
understandings, she appears, in fact, to be asserting her own
particular values and beliefs. Consider the following passage:
I believe that... personhood should understand many kinds of particulars-one's politics, work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral commitments, character, and personal attributes-as integral to the self. To understand any of these
things as monetizable... is to do violence to our deepest understanding
65
of what it is to be human.

Notice that this quotation starts out as a statement of personal belief and concludes as a statement about shared understanding. How could such a statement be considered representative of shared understanding? Different people will hold
different views concerning which of those "particulars" that Radin lists ought or ought not to be "monetizable." Many, for example, will probably not see any reason for precluding trade in
certain types of experience, wisdom and personal attribute; and
to suggest to those people that allowing such trade does violence
"to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human" would
probably seem bizarre. Radin simply asserts that there exists
some basic consensus regarding the proper scope of markets.
However, she demonstrates nothing of the sort.
CONCLUSION: THE PRICE OF MARKETS

"[I]t seems to me," Holmes wrote a century ago, "that every
lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics," for that
discipline teaches us "that for everything we have to give up
something else," that we must "set the advantage we gain
against the other advantage we lose, and... know what we are
63. Id. at 104.
64. Id. at 127.
65. Id. at 56.
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doing when we elect."6" I have argued in this review that, in advancing her perspective on commodification, Radin tends to resort to exaggerated hypotheticals and caricatures concerning
commercial activity and to assume and assert (but not demonstrate) that there exist fundamental shared understandings concerning the appropriate reach of markets. By way of conclusion,
I should like to offer one further criticism. Holmes appreciated
that, in law as elsewhere, choices impose prices. Radin, in identifying the double bind which markets often create, appears to
appreciate much the same. Yet sometimes she considers only
one side of the problem. "Why should it matter," she asks, "if
someone conceptualizes the entire human universe as one giant
bundle of scarce goods subject to free alienation by contract?"
"[I]t matters because," among other things, market "rhetoric
might lead less-than-perfect practitioners to wrong answers in
sensitive cases" and because such rhetoric may be "insulting or
[injure] personhood regardless of results."6 7 Of course, declaring

market rhetoric to be inappropriate in relation to sensitive issues may turn out to be an over-paternalistic course of action;
the risk of getting things "wrong" is not the exclusive preserve
of those who seek solutions through market reasoning. But
there is a more fundamental issue to be addressed here, an issue which Radin seems not to have grasped.
Without doubt, the application of market reasoning to what
are commonly regarded to be non-market activities sometimes
causes considerable consternation and offense. If, however, there
is indeed a risk in certain contexts that market reasoning may
prove insulting, why should anyone other than attention-seekers
and shock-tacticians wish to resort to it? Perhaps the answer is
that, although the choice to use market reasoning will impose a
price, there will be a good chance that this price is worth paying. Radin at one point invites us to
[i]magine the case of grief-stricken parents being asked to donate the
heart of a brain-dead child to a newborn victim of congenital heart disease in a distant hospital. The parents are being asked to give up the
symbolic integrity of their child and face immediately the brute fact of
death. The act of donating the heart may be one of those distinctively
human moments of terrible glory in which one gives up a significant aspect of oneself so that others may live and flourish.6

"But now imagine," she continues,
66. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L Rav. 457, 474 (1897).
67. Radin, supra note 13, at 84.
68. Id. at 97.
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the experience if the grieving parents know that the market price of
hearts is $50,000. There seems to be a sense that the heroic moment
now cannot be, either for them to experience or for us to observe, in respect and perhaps recognition. If the parents take the money, then the
money is the reason for their action. But if they don't take the money,
then the act can seem like transferring 'their' $50,000 to the transplant
recipient ....

No matter what choice the parents make, the opportunity

69
for a pure act of caring is foreclosed.

No doubt, in such tragic circumstances, the presence of the
market does rob us of something. No doubt there is a price to be
paid. Surely, however, it is worth paying that price if a consequence is that the lives of others are improved or saved. While
the loss of a potential 'heroic moment" may well be a cause for
lament, one of the reasons for arguing in favor of markets in situations such as the above is that they may prompt people to do
what they might otherwise not have done. There exist, for Radin, "noncommodified ideals of political life, of social value, of
self-constitution in a social context," and those ideals, she insists, should be regarded as "precious."70 Yet we inhabit, as she
says, a "nonideal world."71 Acknowledging the double-bind means
appreciatirig that, in such a world, the noblest strategies are not
always the most desirable ones.

69. I&
70. Id. at 223.

71. Id. at 110.

